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The working definition of the concept of “legitimacy” is that “[l]egitimacy is a much 
contested concept. Much of the empirically‐oriented political science literature on the issue builds 
on Weber’s classic definition, which emphasized that legitimacy was based on the belief of the 
followers, subjects, or citizens that an authority is morally valid or rightful”1. I posit that legitimacy 
is very context-dependent. What is accepted as legitimate in a case, therefore, may not reach the 
same acceptance in a different place or time. Moreover, legitimacy is the final result of a process. 
Therefore, legitimacy is an ascribed attribute, while legitimation is the process of ascribing. Finally, 
as Zeldicht suggests, a “large part of the literature on legitimacy is normative” 2, while the goal of 
this work is to be descriptive.  
“Legitimacy is and can only be the result of an interactive political process between rulers 
and ruled. These complex processes of legitimation culminating in the (non-)attribution of 
legitimacy comprise both the bottom-up attribution of legitimacy by social constituencies and the 
top-down cultivation of legitimacy by rulers.”3  
Therefore, in order to analyse legitimacy there is the need of a bottom-up analysis, which is 
proven to be extremely difficult in authoritarian regimes. To day, Cuba is still very secretive and 
selective about the information accessible from the outside. In contrast, legitimation is easier to spot 
even in closed regimes and, most importantly, it does not imply success. There can be legitimation 
attempts that do not lead to the actual achievement of legitimacy. It is for all these reasons that I 
decided to use the concept of legitimation in my analysis. However, it is still important to analyse 
the concept of legitimacy, along with legitimation.  
 
1. Theories of legitimacy  
 
The analysis of the concept of legitimacy is very old. Zleditch
4
 dates it back to Thucydides. 
In the literature is frequently found an equation between longevity of a regime and legitimacy. 
                                                 
1 Hoffmann, B. (2011, December). Legitimacy and Efficiency of Political Systems The International Dimensions of 
Authoritarian Legitimation: The Impact of Regime Evolution . GIGA (German Institute of Global and Area Studies) 
Research Programme (182), p. 5. 
2 Zelditch, M. j. (2001). Theories of Legitimacy. In T. a. Jost, The Psychology of Legitimacy (pp. 33-53). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p. 33 
3 Gronau, J., Schmidkte, H., & Biegoń, D. (September 3-6, 2014). ECPR General Conference. The quest for legitimacy 
in world politics - international institutions' legitimation strategies (pp. 1-47). Glasgow: University of Bremen 
Collaborative Research Centre 597, p. 10.  
4 Zelditch, M. j. (2001). Theories of Legitimacy. In T. a. Jost, The Psychology of Legitimacy (pp. 33-53). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
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However, this is problematic
5
. Longevity could indeed be a product of legitimacy, but these two 
terms are not equivalent because longevity is a function of time, while legitimacy is a function of a 
social structure. Most of the previous research focuses on the moment legitimacy lacks, therefore 
linking it to the stability of governments or political stability. Machiavelli is probably the first 
thinker that posits that political stability is tightly linked to acceptance from the people, which is 
dependent on legitimacy. Therefore, legitimacy is of paramount importance to political stability, 
because it produces acceptance and consent to be ruled. “The problem of any kind of polity, 
therefore, is to find a basis of loyalty that is voluntary but not purely instrumental; that does not 
depend only on rational self-interest or purely on personal preferences.”6  
There are various theories of legitimacy. Consensus theory is probably best set out by 
Parsons
7
 and it implies that: the acceptance of a social order is voluntary; consent is based on a 
belief in norms and values; there are shared beliefs and norms between rulers and the ruled; it is 
consensus that makes norms and values ‘right’, therefore ‘legitimate’; and, finally, a social or 
political order is stable if and only if it is legitimate. Consent is, therefore, perceived as a function 
of legitimacy, which is thought to be based either on consensus or public interest, or a combination 
of both. Lipset
8
 posits that anything instrumental to attaining a group’s goal is legitimate if there is 
consensus about the group’s goal. Legitimacy is still seen as an attribute of stability. However, 
Lipset introduces the concept of ineffectiveness, which is seen as a force of delegitimation, hence 
destabilization in the long run.  
The first and main exponent of conflict theory is Machiavelli. Conflict theorists understand 
the fundamental nature of any action to be instrumental; moreover, the real interests of the rulers 
and the ruled are in conflict; and it is power that makes the rules binding. However, pure power is 
not enough to make a rule ‘right’; ideology, myths and rituals are all necessary to legitimate rules, 
by masking the real interests of the ruler to the ruled. Thus, the use by rulers of legitimating myths 
is purely strategic. Finally, legitimacy is seen as a prerequisite of any social order, because, in the 
long run, pure power alone is unstable.  
Marx’s theory of the dominant ideology touches legitimacy only indirectly. It states that the 
ruling class controls the means of mental production, and has therefore the power to create the 
ruling ideas of any given epoch, which will coincide with the ideas of the ruling class. “The 
                                                 
5 Horowitz, I. L. (1992) Revolution, longevity and legitimacy in communist states 
6 Zelditch, M. j. (2001). Theories of Legitimacy. In T. a. Jost, The Psychology of Legitimacy (pp. 33-53). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p.37 
7 Parsons, T. (1969). Politics and Social Structure. New York: Free Press. 
8 Lispet, S. M. (1959). Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. The 
American Political Science Review, 53(1), 69-105. 
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function of these ideas is to conceal conflict of the real interests of the classes. Acceptance of these 
ideas by the ruled is a prerequisite of the stability of a social formation such as capitalism.”9 There 
is therefore a conflict between real interests and ‘false consciousness’. Conflict theory posits that 
are real interests that drive the behavior of people. This means that it is power and not consent that 
makes the rule and is the consciousness of this conflict between interests that lights up revolutions.  
Weber distinguishes between three sources of legitimacy: rational-legal, traditional, and 
charismatic. He posits that legitimation processes are collective rather than individual, and that 
consensus is both one of its prerequisites and one of its outcomes. His innovative concept of self-
legitimation of rulers adds an inward-looking aspect to legitimation. Self-legitimation means that 
the rulers try to legitimate themselves claiming a special status or quality, a noble lineage, some 
source of prestige that elevates them from the rest of the population. Endogenous legitimation 
includes both the claims and the concrete actions that are taken to cultivate those claims. In this 
sense, therefore, legitimation is a means of convincing subjects of the ‘specialness’ of leaders. 
 
2. Approaches to the study of legitimacy 
 
There are three principal approaches to the study of legitimacy: the normative approach
10
, 
which assesses legitimacy as a quality of government; the empirical or historical approach
11
, which 
studies popular attitudes and support for rulers as the basis for analysis and prediction of regime 
stability; and a combination of the two
12
. A fourth approach builds on Weber’s elements of self-
legitimation. 
The normative approach
13
 treats legitimacy as a characteristic of successful regimes in 
which there is a transfer of consent from subjects to rulers. Moreover, rulers are perceived as agents 
rather than actors, because the sources of their legitimacy are perceived as external to themselves.  
The empirical or historical approach uses the term legitimacy to depict a regime which is 
supported by its subjects. Democracy is perceived as the most reliable way to express and study 
                                                 
9 Zelditch, M. j. (2001). Theories of Legitimacy. In T. a. Jost, The Psychology of Legitimacy (pp. 33-53). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p.37 .  
10
 Connolly, W. (1984). Legitimacy and the State (Oxford, Blackwell). 
11 Zelditch, M. j. (2001). Theories of Legitimacy. In T. a. Jost, The Psychology of Legitimacy (pp. 33-53). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
12 Beetham, D. (2013). The Legitimation of Power (London, Macmillan). 
13
 Connolly, W. (1984). Legitimacy and the State (Oxford, Blackwell). 
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public support. This approach, however, is flawed in a number of ways: the argument is circular, 
deducing consent from obedience, and obedience from consent; legitimacy is conceived as a 
synonym of support; moreover, it has been argued that if a regime is described as legitimate only 
because its subjects believe it to be legitimate, this empties the term of any moral content that some 
commenters believe it ought to have
14
.   
Yet, to separate legitimacy from other reasons of support is extremely complicated
15
. Actors 
both in the national and international arenas might have various motivations for supporting an 
armed group. Support does not necessarily entail belief in the legitimacy of the group or their cause 
either; it could be the result of purely tactical or geo-political considerations, or the outcome of fear 
and threats. On the other hand, the achievement of legitimacy does not automatically lead to active 
involvement. Active support is bound to many variables, among which concrete opportunities and 
personal ties to group members. Therefore, there needs to be an analytical distinction between 
legitimacy and support, which is a more extensive category.  
For an empirical study to be accurate, however, there is the need to acknowledge that 
political values as well as legitimacy are various and context-dependent. And while most political 
scientists believe that democracy is the most legitimate form of government, a vast portion of the 
world today is not democratic, suggesting that other political forms employ different modes of 
legitimation that end up being more or less effective.  
3. Legitimation and illegitimacy 
 
The study of legitimation as self-referential starts off from Weber’s work. It posits that 
legitimation is actively sought by rulers and that the principal consumers are the governmental 
elites. What this approach puts forward is that what characterizes government is the activity of 
legitimation, rather than the possession of the ascribed quality of legitimacy. Moreover, legitimation 
processes are understood as dependent on the formal and substantive character of the particular 
regime
16
. 
                                                 
14 Barker, R. (2001). Legitimating Identities: The Self-Presentations of Rulers and Subjects. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
15 Schlichte, K. and Schneckener, U., (2016, February). Armed Groups and the Politics of Legitimacy. Civil Wars, 
17(4), 409-424. 
16 Barker, R. (2001). Legitimating Identities: The Self-Presentations of Rulers and Subjects. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
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In his research, Schoon
17
 states that legitimacy is a problematic term, because it is context-
dependent. However, he finds that the conditions for political illegitimacy (the absence of rule by 
consent of the governed
18
) represent a wider phenomenon that transcends local contexts
19
. 
However, conditions of illegitimacy are not necessarily the opposite of the conditions of 
legitimacy
20
. Generally, there is a wider consensus on what is to be condemned as wrong, instead of 
what is to be regarded as right. Legitimacy is, therefore, seen as an individual exercise, while 
illegitimacy is experienced and assessed at a collective level
21
. However, some commentators have 
pointed out that “the legitimacy of armed actors is a function of the illegitimate violence exerted by 
the opponent” 22, therefore linking the illegitimacy of an actor to an increase of legitimacy to its 
opponent.  
Schoon defines the “legitimacy of state-sanctioned violence as the perception among the 
civilian population in the area of conflict that violence sanctioned by the state is right or 
appropriate, relative to known alternatives.”23 This definition is important because it takes into 
account the agents of legitimacy, which is the civilian population in the area of conflict. Moreover, 
it emphasizes the relative nature of legitimacy. This implies that legitimacy is not an absolute value, 
but it is rather shaped both by the degree to which the violence can be justified and by the available 
alternatives. Relativity is also connected to the concept of proportionality, with the consensus that 
some degree of violence may be necessary to achieve a given outcome, but a higher amount of 
violence would not be considered legitimated
24
.  
After analyzing thirty cases of insurgencies, Schoon
25
 finds that two elements were present 
                                                 
17 Schoon, E. (2014). The Asymmetry of Legitimacy: Analyzing the Legitimation of Violence in 30 Cases of Insurgent 
Revolution. Social Forces, 93(2), 779-802. 
18 Horowitz, I. (1992). Revolution, longevity and legitimacy in communist states. Studies In Comparative International 
Development, 27(1), 61-75. 
19 Schoon, E. (2014). The Asymmetry of Legitimacy: Analyzing the Legitimation of Violence in 30 Cases of Insurgent 
Revolution. Social Forces, 93(2), p.780. 
20
 McWilliams, W. (1971). “On Political Illegitimacy.” In The Democratic Soul: A Wilson Carey McWilliams Reader, 
edited by W. C. McWilliams, P. J. Deneen, S. J. McWilliams, 240–64. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. 
21 McWilliams, W. (1971), p. 246. 
22 Schlichte, K. and Schneckener, U., (2016, February). Armed Groups and the Politics of Legitimacy. Civil Wars, 
17(4), 409-424. 
23 Schoon, E. (2014). The Asymmetry of Legitimacy: Analyzing the Legitimation of Violence in 30 Cases of Insurgent 
Revolution. Social Forces, 93(2), p. 794. 
24 Gardam, J. (1993). “Proportionality and Force in International Law.” American Journal of International Law 87(3), 
391–413.  
25 Schoon, E. (2014). The Asymmetry of Legitimacy: Analyzing the Legitimation of Violence in 30 Cases of Insurgent 
Revolution. Social Forces, 93(2), 779-802. 
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in all of his case studies: a lack of governmental legitimacy and the absence of efforts to maintain 
positive relations with the civilian population in the area of conflict. Moreover, his research shows 
that there is indeed an asymmetry between legitimacy and illegitimacy, with legitimacy more 
contingent on context and outcome, while illegitimacy rooted in the immediate realities of the 
perpetrators and their actions.  
Ample research has shown that perceptions of legitimacy are shaped by social systems and 
shared beliefs
26
. However, while standards for legitimacy are shared at a collective level, 
evaluations against those standards are contingent on the ones making evaluations.  
4. Legitimacy and non-state actors 
 
But is it feasible to apply the same definition of legitimacy that is used in the study of 
governments to non-state actors? The answer to this question is not straightforward. As Arjona
27
 
suggests, there are cases in which rebel groups establish a form of governance over the territories 
they control, and in this case it might be possible. But at the same time, being non-state actors less 
(or non) institutionalized, this exercise might be complicated.  
According to Schlichte and Schneckener
28
, violent non-state actors need to address the 
politics of legitimacy in three different ways for different purposes: first of all, they need to present 
their use of violence as legitimate; second, they need to gain legitimacy for moral and material 
support; finally, they need to be able to simultaneously address several audiences, both domestically 
and internationally.  
With respect to the legitimation of violent means, the most common claims regard the 
defensive use of violence; protection or liberation of communities from oppression; reaction to 
injustices; self-determination; the defense of autonomy. It is not uncommon to find these claims 
connected to larger and often international geo-political discourses
29
. The creation of mystic figures 
of heroes and martyrs of the struggle is a further source of legitimation that is directly connected to 
forms of what Weber called ‘charismatic leadership’. This discourse fits in the broader narrative of 
                                                 
26 Schoon, E. (2014). The Asymmetry of Legitimacy: Analyzing the Legitimation of Violence in 30 Cases of Insurgent 
Revolution. Social Forces, 93(2), 779-802. 
27 Arjona, A., Kasfir, N., Mampilly, Z., (2015). Rebel Governance in Civil War. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
28 Schlichte, K. and Schneckener, U., (2016). Armed Groups and the Politics of Legitimacy. Civil Wars, 17(4), 409-424. 
29 Schlichte, K. and Schneckener, U., (2016) 
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an epic struggle
30
. Moreover, typical patterns can be encountered also in the justification for the 
internal use of violence. This means that when the violence is not indiscriminate, rebel leaders 
usually try to legitimate it portraying purged members as traitors and defectors menacing the 
group’s coherence and unity either collaborating with the enemy, or undermining the leader’s 
status. Discriminate in-group violence has also been used to discipline members and to secure their 
compliance
31
. 
However, the use of violence has a dual effect on legitimacy. On one hand, violence is a 
powerful means of communication that conveys power and resolution not just to the enemy, but to a 
wider audience. This might attract active and passive supporters, and will likely boost the attention 
and coverage the group gets both from the press and the political arena, which will in turn boost its 
legitimacy. On the other hand, violence can lead to a loss of legitimacy, especially if it is 
indiscriminate and is exerted over a long period of time
32
. A massive increase in violence against 
civilians or a strong, decisive response from either the state or other non-state actors would 
undermine the credibility of the leadership both internally and externally, leading to a decrease in 
support and legitimacy, which could open a perilous circle. Less legitimacy could lead to more 
(internal and external) violence, which will in turn lead to a further loss of legitimacy, and so on. In 
order to try to avoid this, many non-state armed groups employ more or less formal rules of 
engagement in particular with regard to the civilian population. Some groups do even have a system 
of sanctions for transgressors. Some commenters believe that these claims and the development of 
an internal mechanism of violence control is part of the legitimation strategy of these groups
33
.         
Furthermore, there are various possible sources of legitimacy. What is important to point out 
is that legitimation is not exclusively directed outwards, but also inwards. Internal legitimation is 
just as crucial as the external one. Legitimating narratives also have the role of fostering a specific 
self-image that the group wants to spread, one that is frequently mystified in order to give more 
importance to the group. Armed groups can be seen as political actors that construct narratives to 
bolster their legitimacy claims
34
.  
Legitimation is a multi-faceted process. This means that armed groups have to (and most of 
the time do) rely on various sources of legitimacy simultaneously. This might derive from the fact 
                                                 
30 Podder, S. (2013, March). Non-State Armed Groups and Stability: Reconsidering Legitimacy and Inclusion. 
Contemporary Security Policy, 34(1), 16-39. 
31 Schlichte, K. and Schneckener, U., (2016). Armed Groups and the Politics of Legitimacy. Civil Wars, 17(4), 409-424. 
32
 Mampilly, Z. (2011) Rebel Rulers. Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War (Ithaca, Ny: Cornell 
University Press) pp.53–55.  
33 Schlichte, K. and Schneckener, U., (2016). Armed Groups and the Politics of Legitimacy. Civil Wars, 17(4), 409-424. 
34 Ibid.  
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that they usually operate outside of the legal arena and that, unlike state-actors, they cannot rely on 
the legitimacy provided by elections or systems of representation
35
. 
In a consistent number of groups, traditional belief is a precious source of legitimacy
36
. This 
means that leaders have an intrinsic legitimacy when descendants from aristocratic or other 
prominent families. Likewise, legitimacy will derive from professional or military accomplishments 
and the status derived from such experiences. It is worth mentioning that heritage as well as 
accomplishments can be falsified or invented to serve the need of status and legitimation
37
. 
Schlichte and Schneckener suggest distinguishing between symbolic and performance-
centered sources of legitimacy. Symbolic sources are linked with the narrative put forward by the 
group, while the latter category refers to the actual behavior and performance of armed groups. 
Regarding symbolic sources of legitimacy, rebel claims might be rooted in “communal 
myth–symbol complexes and in popular belief systems, traditions and cultures. Arguments and 
claims are to some extent embedded in a local sociocultural setting; however, they also represent a 
specific reading of this setting. In this way, these linkages between armed groups’ claims and local 
cultures are deliberately chosen and constructed, but they cannot simply be manufactured or 
instrumentalized by the leadership or intellectual figures of armed groups.”38  
Moreover, another type of claim might be based on the socio-economic and political 
aspirations of a specific sector of the local community
39
. Using this strategy, rebel leaders take on 
the grievances of the population and make them relevant and heard. Doing so, they link themselves 
to those communities, present themselves as their voice, and claim to act on their behalf. They see 
themselves as frontrunners for the legitimate demands of those communities and claim that their 
violent actions are necessary to raise consciousness and to mobilize wider support. Frequently, such 
claims are linked to broader, international ideologies. 
Furthermore, another source of legitimacy derives directly from the (constructed/perceived) 
threat of the enemy. The non-state group may claim that its purpose is to liberate or protect a 
threatened community. The more brutal and inhuman the enemy is portrayed, the most solidarity 
the group will receive and the most likely for its violence to be seen as justified and necessary
40
. 
                                                 
35 Schlichte, K. and Schneckener, U., (2016). Armed Groups and the Politics of Legitimacy. Civil Wars, 17(4), 409-424. 
36
 Arjona, A., Kasfir, N., Mampilly, Z. (2015). Rebel Governance in Civil War. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
37 Schlichte, K. and Schneckener, U., (2016). Armed Groups and the Politics of Legitimacy. Civil Wars, 17(4), 409-424. 
38 Schlichte, K. and Schneckener, U., (2016), p.417. 
39
 Arjona, A., Kasfir, N., Mampilly, Z. (2015). Rebel Governance in Civil War. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
40 Schlichte, K. and Schneckener, U., (2016, February). Armed Groups and the Politics of Legitimacy. Civil Wars, 
17(4), 409-424. 
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Performance-centered politics of legitimacy
41
: charismatic leadership is of paramount 
importance, together with the charisma of the warrior group’s elite. In this sense, the exercise of 
violence is instrumental as a way of communication in itself; fighters might earn the respect of 
some factions of the audience for their willingness to sacrifice themselves for a greater cause; 
legitimacy can also be achieved through personal loyalties, often in patrimonial forms; a further 
source of legitimacy is the ‘delivery-based legitimization’42, which poses that legitimacy can be 
gained through the delivery of basic services to the followers and the population. Where forms of 
rebel governance are in place, this could include more sophisticated services like taxation and some 
form of jurisdiction. Internal institutionalization or the implement of formal procedures furthers the 
legitimacy of the group because, among other things, it makes it move away (at least formally) from 
forms of patrimonialism.  
Usually, armed groups tend to employ both types of sources in order to gain the widest 
legitimacy possible. However, symbolic sources tend to be more effective in the formation period 
of the group, while in the longer term concrete successes become more relevant.  
What makes legitimation additionally complicated is the fact that armed groups can and 
need to address their legitimacy claims to at least three different arenas
43
: the segments of the 
population that are most likely to be active supporters of the struggle; local or national audiences; 
and the international arena, which includes states, international organizations, NGOs, and the 
media. The first two arenas are of the utmost importance in every stage of the life of an armed 
group, because most sources of legitimacy come directly from local audiences, and most claims of 
armed groups are framed in a way to represent local constituencies. However, the international level 
is just as important, especially in the case when armed groups turn into mainstream political parties, 
or look for foreign support. In this context, non-state actors try to address foreign public opinion 
and actors that might be sympathetic to their cause. They do this by aligning themselves with 
international politics norms and trends both through their actions and their narrative
44
. Another way 
some armed groups have tried to gain the support of the public opinion and the international 
community is to pledge to adhere to international humanitarian law
45
 (for example, groups such as 
the Namibian SWAPO and the Palestinian PLO have pledged to respect the Geneva Convention). 
                                                 
41 Schlichte, K. and Schneckener, U., (2016). Armed Groups and the Politics of Legitimacy. Civil Wars, 17(4), 409-424. 
42 Giustozzi, A., (2012). Empires of Mud. Wars and Warlords in Afghanistan (London: Hurst 2012) in Schlichte and 
Schneckener. 
43 Schlichte, K. and Schneckener, U., (2016). Armed Groups and the Politics of Legitimacy. Civil Wars, 17(4), 409-424. 
44 Schlichte, K. and Schneckener, U., (2016). 
45Arjona, A., Kasfir, N., Mampilly, Z. (2015). Rebel Governance in Civil War. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
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However, the international arena can have positive effects on the internal legitimacy of a given 
group even if its response to it is negative. The imposition of sanctions, in fact, is in itself a form of 
recognizing the importance of that group.  
External recognition, however, may have a double effect on internal cohesion and 
legitimacy. On the one hand, the armed group is strong of the acceptance of representativeness of 
the population’s claims. On the other hand, this doubles the expectations that have to be met by the 
group, that needs to live up to both standards, which are likely to be to some extent in conflict. 
Moreover, when external recognition is tied to a demand of moderation, this could weaken the 
group’s internal cohesion and lead to the creation of breakaway radical factions. Furthermore, 
excessive reliance on foreign support may cause a loss of legitimacy because the group might be 
accused of being steered by foreign powers
46
. 
Legitimacy in itself is not enough to lead to success, but it is believed to be of crucial 
importance to gain power and, according to Weber, is the “decisive element in turning mere power 
into political authority.” 47 Generally speaking, legitimacy is about the making of claims and the 
conditions under which such claims are accepted. The activity of legitimation, therefore, is 
observable in the making of claims by a government or by rebel leaders. Then, legitimacy is the 
belief in the justification of a political actor (being it a state or an armed group) and its activities. 
“Legitimacy is thus a descriptive concept about normative judgements, but it is not itself a 
normative concept.” 48  
5. Legitimation and the Cuban Revolution 
 
 Despite the thorough study of the Cuban Revolution over the last fifty years, there is still 
room for new research; particularly research that tries to combine literature both pro and against the 
regime.  Most of the prominent literature about the Cuban Revolution looks at it just from one point 
of view, and tends to understand the outcome as sort of the lesser of two evils, as a forced choice 
between the de-facto dictatorship of Batista, and the revolutionaries’ promises49.  
 
 Ex post facto, there has been a mystification of the most prominent figures of the 
                                                 
46 Schlichte, K. and Schneckener, U., (2016, February). Armed Groups and the Politics of Legitimacy. Civil Wars, 
17(4), 409-424. 
47 Schlichte, K. and Schneckener, U, (2016). p. 411. 
48 Schlichte, K. and Schneckener, U., (2016). p. 416. 
49 (AlRoy, 1967); (DeFronzo, 1994); (Dominguez, 1993); (Farber, 2006); (Kapcia, 2014); (Whitehead L., 2016). 
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Revolution
50
, both in Western and non-Western thought, and this has led to emphasis on analysis 
that to some extent present a simplistic understanding of the 26
th
 of July Movement (M-26-7) and 
its aftermath. In order to demystify Cuban history, the research broadens the horizons through the 
means of an extensive literature research, especially to include primary sources, where possible.  
 
 To grasp a fuller understanding of the process of legitimation that the M-26-7 went through, I 
will analyse their image and (self-)portrayal through the different means of communication, and by 
comparison to Batista’s rule. Central to the analysis will be the two main policy manifestos of the 
Cuban Revolution: the Moncada trial speech (‘History will absolve me’), and the Manifesto of the 
Sierra Maestra (MSM). This because these papers resulted in being the programmatic basis for both 
the Revolution and the early government, and helped establish the figure of Fidel Castro as a viable 
alternative to Batista and as the leader of the armed struggle.  
 Moreover, an anticipated outcome is to find out if the fact that there were charismatic and 
visible leaders of the rebellion (most notably the Castro brothers, Che Guevara, and Camilo 
Cienfuegos) helped it or not. I focus my analysis on the figure of Fidel Castro and his speeches, 
since he ended up being the most influential rebel leader and would later impose his regime, and 
has governed Cuba for decades until his official retirement in 2006.  
 
 The Cuban Revolution has been frequently explained as a response to foreign interference 
(real or perceived) in national affairs: in the article Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, 
DeFronzo
51
 argues that the United States’ support of Batista’s government helped boost the 
legitimacy of the rebels’ claim to act in the name of national interests and sovereignty. Batista was 
depicted as a cruel dictator at the mercy of foreign powers, leading a corrupted government that did 
not represent the Cuban population. In this context, the revolutionaries managed to present 
themselves as the guardians of Cuban values and history.  
 
 A comparison of the Batista and Castro regimes could give some insight into their different 
fate and the legitimacy of Castro and the Cuban Revolution
52
. Whitehead finds that despite the 
similar way in which the two came to power (with a power struggle that lead to a regime change) 
and their repressive and personalist rule, the two regimes differed in their strategy for building 
legitimacy. Batista was actively supported by the US and this foreign interference delegitimized his 
                                                 
50 (Dominguez, 1993); (Farber, 2006); (Kapcia, 2014); (Marquez-Sterling, 2009); (del Aguila, 1999) 
51 DeFronzo, J. (1994). Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements. Journal of World History, 5(1), 156-158. 
52 Whitehead, L. (2016). The 'puzzle' of autocratic resilience/regime collapse: the case of Cuba. Third World Quarterly, 
37(9), 1666-1682. 
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rule, while the open opposition of the US to Castro helped foster internal legitimacy, reinforcing the 
idea of ‘patria o muerte’ (‘homeland or death’) and of a highly ideological domestic revolution in 
defiance of external powers. In general, it is believed that the existence of a credible external threat, 
identified in US interventionism, was vital in the creation of internal legitimation
53
. Moreover, 
Castro’s Cuba did alternate and combine national sovereignty and communist ideology as sources 
of legitimacy
54
, creating a rather complex and durable legitimation.  
  
 Another way in which legitimacy of the Cuban Revolution has been explained is through an 
ethno-religious analysis of the background of the Sierra Maestra fighters. Farber finds out that 
among them there were “a significant number of first-generation Cubans, the children of Spanish 
immigrants”55, and in general mainly white people from the middle class, the ones who were 
attracted by the Cuban populist discourse, therefore separating the legitimacy of the Revolution 
from communist ideology, and instead explaining it through nationalism and populism. 
 
While most of these explanations can work separately, I believe that an approach that treats 
those as different aspects of the same phenomenon has the best explicative potential. Therefore, my 
research will have a multidisciplinary approach and will try to combine different explanations from 
distinct disciplines and theoretic approaches, to understand the phenomenon in a cohesive way.  
  
                                                 
53 (Dominguez, 1993); (Farber, 2006); (Lopez, 2002) 
54 Whitehead, L. (2016). The 'puzzle' of autocratic resilience/regime collapse: the case of Cuba. Third World Quarterly, 
37(9), 1666-1682.  
55 Farber, S. (2006). The origins of the Cuban Revolution reconsidered. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
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6. Research Methods and Theoretical Framework 
 
 This research will employ two main research methods. First, I will employ a process tracing 
method, looking for the causal factors that made the Revolution and its victory possible and the 
legitimation methods connected to it.  
The second method that will be applied is the use of discourse analysis to understand Cuban 
propaganda, its message, and its reception from both the population and foreigners. The aim of 
looking at propaganda is to analyse the message. This will lead to a comparative study between 
different time periods in order to discover if the legitimation strategy changed over time and if it 
did, if it changed accordingly with other major political or historical events.  
 
There are different possible legitimation strategies that draw from different legitimising 
sources. This thesis is set to differentiate the legitimation processes that were in play during the 
Cuban Revolution and, in particular, around the figure of Fidel Castro, the sources they stemmed 
from, and their target. The main theoretical framework that will be employed is Weber’s work on 
the sources of legitimacy. In this context, his theory of endogenous legitimation will be central, 
because it takes into account the different possible target audiences and the need to differentiate the 
legitimation strategies accordingly.  
Endogenous legitimation refers to “an action or series of actions – speeches, writing, ritual, 
display – whereby people justify to themselves or others the actions they are taking and the 
identities they are expressing or claiming”56. What is important of this theory is the notion that 
rulers often need to justify their power to themselves, that there are different audiences the leaders 
are trying to convince, and, therefore, that there need to be different legitimation strategies for 
different audiences.  
However, in order to be comprehensive, endogenous legitimation needs to be combined with 
the study of mass-legitimation. I argue that mass-legitimation is connected with self-legitimation, 
since this is oftentimes used as a tool of self-promotion, self-integration, and self-exemplification
57
. 
                                                 
56 Barker, R. (2001). Legitimating Identities: The Self-Presentations of Rulers and Subjects. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 163-164. 
57 Jones , E., & Pittman, T. (1982). Toward a General Theory of Strategic Self-Presentation. In J. Suls, Psychological 
Perspectives on the Self (Vol. 1, pp. 231-262). Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 
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This means that the actors that employ the legitimation processes strive to possess a moral authority 
and to get their audience to identify with them. 
Gronau, Schmidkte and Biegoń define legitimation strategies as “goal-oriented activities 
employed to establish and maintain a reliable basis of diffuse support for a political regime by its 
social constituencies”58 and distinguish between substantive and communicative strategies. 
Substantive strategies involve institutional change, while the communicative ones employ 
communication instruments such as speeches and manifestos, and can be carried out by and through 
a pletora of actors, such as political leaders and the media.  
In the case of the Cuban Revolution, the legitimation strategy implemented was of a 
communicative nature. I argue that in that period there was an active and conscius search for 
legitimation from the different souls of the armed struggle, and will analise the strategies 
implemented by Fidel Castro and the 26
th
 of July Movement (M-26-7).  
I will divide the numerous processes of legitimation based on the different means they 
employ and audiences they plan to reach and influence, and analise the different sources of the 
legitimation processes. These can be divided into national-historical, authoritative-normative, and 
by comparison. The national-historical sources include references to Martí, Maceo, the War of 
Independence, the Constitution. The authoritative-normative sources include arguments such as the 
ousting of an illegitimate rule, the elimination of imperialist influence, and themes such as 
democracy, coup d'état, human rights, foreign invasion, imperialism, illegality, the Constitution. 
References to the Constitution are, therefore, both historical and normative. The third source of 
legitimation is by comparison, alternatively with Batista and his army, and with other souls of the 
Revolution. 
  
                                                 
58 Gronau, J., Schmidkte, H., & Biegoń, D. (September 3-6, 2014). ECPR General Conference. The quest for legitimacy 
in world politics - international institutions' legitimation strategies (pp. 1-47). Glasgow: University of Bremen 
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7. Legitimation through history 
 
a. History of rural guerrilla 
 
Rural guerrilla in Cuba had a respected tradition. It dated back to the nineteenth century struggle for 
independence from Spain. Castro associated himself and his struggle with the War of Independence 
led by Antonio Maceo and José Martí’s ideas59. He claimed that the Revolution was derived from 
that struggle and intended to complete it and achieve the objectives that the war could not achieve 
or that were lost under Batista’s dictatorship. Moreover, the link with the fighters for independence, 
who had become Cuban heroes, was a strong source of legitimacy and helped present the Sierra 
guerrillas as idealized fighters fighting to complete the independence struggle and to restore 
constitutional freedoms that were undermined by Batista’s coup60.  
b. Link to Martí 
 
Castro’s frequent use and references to Martí’s image and thought granted him legitimacy61. José 
Martí was widely acknowledged as the ‘Apostle of Cuban Independence’, the mind behind the 
colonial revolution against Spain.  
The similarities in their lives helped cement this parallel between the two figures. Both men 
were arrested for treason and had to go in exile. From exile, both of them planned and carried out an 
invasion of Cuba. Moreover, the M-26-7 was founded on the 100
th
 anniversary of Martí’s birth. 
However, the parallel with the War of Independence did not stop with the figure of Martí. Castro 
carried out a rural guerrilla campaign in the Oriente Province, in the same area where Maceo fought 
a similar campaign in the late nineteenth century.  
Martí was a national hero and as that, he was not tightly linked to a specific political party, 
but was revered by all sectors of the political spectrum and the population as a whole. Identification 
with such a widely respected figure gave a boost to Castro’s legitimacy, enabling him to claim a 
                                                 
59 Miller, N. (2003). The Absolution of History: Uses of the Past in Castro's Cuba. Journal of Contemporary History, 
38(1), 147-162. 
60 Raths, D. (1984). Urban and Rural Guerrilla Warfare: The Cuban Model. Austin: Stephen F. Austin State 
University. 
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link between the Revolution and the heroes of Cuban independence
62
. Martí was, therefore, a sort of 
justificatory agent for the rebels’ actions63, and a unifier one. Martí was a symbol of nationalist 
struggle and of the inevitability of the Revolution
64
.  
 
8. The urban guerrilla 
 
While Castro and his group waged a rural guerrilla war in the mountains of the Sierra Maestra, in 
the eastern part of Cuba, they were not the only insurrectionist group. Several groups opted for a 
different setting and conducted an urban guerrilla, trying to mobilize the population of the cities to 
take part in the revolutionary struggle. The most important of these groups were the Directorio 
Revolutionario Estudiantil (DRE), and the urban branch of the M-26-7, and were present in the 
biggest cities. Both guerrilla strategies aimed at mobilizing the masses, in particular the youth, 
against the Batista regime, but while Castro’s M-26-7 target was a military victory from the 
countryside, the urban groups expected the urban population to rise against the dictatorship. This 
difference in strategy often caused disagreement between the two souls of the struggle
65
, with 
Castro publicly distancing himself and his guerrillas from some of the urban stances and actions.  
The strategy of urban groups was aimed at wearing out Batista’s credibility and at showing 
his impotence against revolutionary violence. To achieve these results, the fighters often planted 
bombs in symbolic but relatively safe places not with the intent to kill, but to cause damage to 
installations and facilities such as the power line or the telephone lines, to highlight the weakness 
and impotence of the army and government in their respect. By interrupting the daily operations in 
the city, they intended to show their relative position of power and discredit the government’s 
stance that the rebellion was under control
66
. However, the large use of bombs and explosives made 
it easy for the government to label them as terrorists.  
The Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil’s strategy to overthrow Batista was a strictly 
                                                 
62 Kice, B. (2008, December). From the Mountains to the Podium: The Rhetoric of Fidel Castro. Louisiana State 
University and Agricultural and Mechanical College. 
63 Rice, D. (1992). The Rhetorical Uses of the Authorizing Figure: Fidel Castro and José Martì. New York: Praeger. 
64 Miller, N. (2003). The Absolution of History: Uses of the Past in Castro's Cuba. Journal of Contemporary History, 
38(1), 147-162. 
65 Kice, B. (2008, December). From the Mountains to the Podium: The Rhetoric of Fidel Castro. Louisiana State 
University and Agricultural and Mechanical College. 
66 DePalma, A. (2006). The man who invented Fidel: Castro, Cuba, and Herbert L. Matthews of the New York Times. 
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military one, their objective was the assassination of Batista (golpe arriba), which they thought 
would make the regime collapse, and the subsequent hold of free, democratic elections. On March 
13, 1957, the DRE carried out an assault of the presidential palace in Havana. Simultaneously, their 
leader José Antonio Echevarría announced on the radio the death of Batista. However, the assault 
failed and resulted in the death of most of the leaders of the DRE, including Echevarría. The failure 
of the plan, the subsequent death of many of the assailants, and the wrong announcement regarding 
Batista’s death highly reduced the group’s credibility. Castro used this defeat to criticize and 
condemn their strategy, referring to it as a useless bloodshed
67
.  
 The other soul of the urban guerrilla fight, the urban branch of the M-26-7, applied a very 
different strategy. Their objective was not the assassination of the dictator, but rather to provoke a 
popular uprising against the regime
68
. To reach this objective, on April 9, 1958, led by the leader 
Faustino Pérez, they instigated a general strike in the major Cuban cities to mobilize the people. 
However, the strike failed, with the result of undermining the legitimacy of urban leaders.  
Moreover, Batista’s strategy to target the urban resistance first favored Castro’s position in 
the revolutionary elite. Because of their high visibility and widespread label as terrorists, they 
diverted the attention and energy of the army away from the guerrillas hiding in the mountains. The 
repression of the army resulted in the capture or death of many combatants and some of the leaders, 
most notably Frank País, leader of the underground M-26-7 in Santiago and critic of Castro.  
Therefore, the failure of some high-profile actions from the urban groups and the deaths of 
the most prominent revolutionary leaders helped to establish Fidel Castro as the most important and 
visible leader of the Revolution, and to grant him and his strategy more legitimacy, compared to the 
obvious failure of urban strategy. Moreover, in the aftermath of the failure of urban guerrilla plans, 
the M-26-7 started carrying out more attacks not only in the mountains, but also in sugar fields and 
in cities, to capitalize the temporary power vacuum with visible actions. 
In this context, Castro and the rural guerrilla (called sierra) increased their relative 
legitimacy in the eyes of the Cuban people by means of comparison with the urban branches (called 
llano) and their failures. By highlighting their defeats and errors, Castro managed to position 
himself as a real and strong alternative to the suicide missions that were carried out in the city. 
                                                 
67 Escalona, R. (1992). The Tiger and the Children: Fidel Castro and the Judgment of History . Abingdon-on-Thames: 
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While the llano fighters were considered terrorists, Castro and his fighters were increasingly seen as 
romanticized figures, unselfishly fighting for freedom.  
9. Batista’s strategy  
 
Batista’s strategy at the beginning of the Revolution was to use Castro’s threat to crack down on 
existing internal opposition to the regime. His military response to the landing of the Granma and 
the following days was not extremely decisive. With the threat of Castro leading a guerrilla group 
against his regime, Batista had the pretext to purge internal political opposition
69
.  
Moreover, in the war against guerrilla Batista decided to start by eradicating the urban 
fighters. The strategy proved relatively successful, with the death of many leaders, which ended 
favoring Castro’s plea as main revolutionary leader.  
Furthermore, in an attempt to isolate the Sierra fighters and to make military operations 
smoother, in the summer of 1957 several families living in the Sierra Maestra were forcibly moved 
and placed in relocations camps. This helped foster the reputation of the brutality of Batista’s army, 
alienating the support of the people. 
10. Legitimation by comparison with the official army and Batista’s government 
 
a. Relations with peasants 
 
Peasants of the Sierra Maestra were considered as natural allies by the rural guerrillas. This was 
partly due to ideological beliefs, and partly because peasants were enduring the poorest living 
conditions in Cuba. In 1953 85% of peasants did not own the land they worked, but rented it
70
. 
Moreover, the literacy rate was extremely low, and they did not have access to good medical care.  
For these reasons, the M-26-7 believed that the Sierra Maestra peasants would be 
sympathetic to their cause. In the early months after the Granma landing, peasant aid, or at least, 
passivism, was crucial for the survival of the rebels
71. But it was only after Batista’s army started 
forcibly relocating and interrogating families and villages that peasant support became more active. 
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However, even if a reasonable number of peasants joined the rebel forces, the command roles 
remained filled by educated, middle-class people
72
.  
Therefore, the involvement of peasants in the Revolution served more a political agenda 
than a military one
73
. Having the support of the people living in the Sierra Maestra helped foster the 
human image of the Sierra fighters, in contrast to Batista’s army. 
b. ‘Humanitarianism’ 
 
Throughout the Revolution, the rural guerrillas were able to create and maintain a ‘humanitarian’ 
image, at least in comparison with the official army. Since cooperation with peasants was vital for 
guerrillas, they posed themselves as benefactors, always paying for the supplies they took from 
stores and peasants, despite a persisting lack of funds
74
. Moreover, as Taber reports, once the 
guerrillas settled in the Sierra Maestra, they established a “revolutionary government with a code of 
law, which could be looked to as a stabilizing force in an area long neglected by the Havana 
government.” 75 Stealing, rape and betrayal were severely punished, oftentimes even with death. 
Finally, rebels often provided the rural population with medical aid and organized schools.  
There are different account regarding the treatment of prisoners. While some authors stress 
the summary shooting of captured soldiers
76
, others choose to highlight the examples of humane 
treatment and medical care given to them. Most probably, both versions are partially right, but the 
official version of Castro and Radio Rebelde was the latter one, and helped the rebels gain a human 
image. During Matthews’ interview, Castro stated that “We are killing many, but when we take 
prisoners they are never shot. We question them, talk kindly to them, take their arms and 
equipment, and then set them free”77.  
In another article, Matthews wrote what was the shared sentiment amongst many in Cuba, in 
which he highlights the harsh comparison between Castro’s and Batista’s treatment of prisoners. 
“This is the sort of conduct that has helped to win for Señor Castro so extraordinary a place in the 
hearts and minds of Cubans and has caused the Government’s accusations of criminality and 
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communism to be ridiculed”78. A series of highly visible actions helped cement Castro’s 
‘humanitarian’ image, the most notable being the release of several wounded soldiers to the Cuban 
Red Cross in July 1958
79
 to allow them to get access to medical care.  
 
 
11. Legitimation through official manifestos 
 
a. The Moncada trial defense: ‘History will absolve me’80 
 
On July 26, 1953 Fidel Castro and a small number of followers carried out an attack of the 
Moncada military Barracks in Santiago de Cuba to seize weapons to aliment an armed insurrection 
against the regime of Batista. Although from a military point of view the attack could be considered 
futile, with almost all participants being killed or captured, including Castro himself, it helped 
establish Castro’s image as a courageous citizen willing to stand up to a corrupt government that 
attained power through illegitimate means, and to present him as a leader of the Revolution
81
. 
Moreover, the Moncada attack is widely accepted as the start of the Cuban Revolution.  
During the trial that followed, Fidel Castro, representing himself, delivered a speech that 
would soon become the program of the revolutionary strategy, turning Castro in a symbol of the 
rebellion. He used his defense plea to denounce the injustices of the Batista regime and presented 
the objectives that the insurgents wanted to achieve: the ousting of the corrupted Batista regime, 
and the implement of ample social reforms under a revolutionary government
82
.  
The speech itself did not act as a defense plea; rather, it acted as a declaration of principles. 
It did not have the objective of asking for mercy, on the contrary, Castro took upon himself the 
responsibility of the planning and carrying out of the attack, and used the speech to denounce the 
unconstitutionality of the Batista regime. He pointed out the unconstitutional moves of the regime 
since its seize of power on March 10, 1952: the reinstatement of the death penalty for treason, the 
disbandment of opposing political parties, the increased difficulty for people to take part in the 
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political sphere. In this context, a typical defense would have been trivial, because of the corruption 
of the whole judicial system
83
.  
In a process of distancing himself from Batista, Castro stated that the principles of the 
Revolution were based on the writings of José Martí, Eduardo Chibás, and the 1940 Constitution 
(symbols of positive change in Cuba), appealing to a nationalist feeling. However, the reforms he 
proposed where socialist in nature (and therefore at the time mostly considered as radical): the 
change of ownership of land from landowners to the small farmers that were renting it; the 
redistribution of land to poor peasant families; a steep reduction of rent prices.  
Moreover, Castro used the speech to distance himself from Batista and other dictators, more 
than to present his program for the Revolution and the future of Cuba
84
. In this way, he managed to 
adopt two separate sources of legitimation: nationalism and socialism. Furthermore, nationalism in 
20
th
 century Cuba was usually paired with anti-imperialistic feelings, both for the still recent 
struggle for independence from Spain, and for the (perceived) involvement of the USA in national 
matters during the Batista regime. Batista was indeed supported by the Unites States, but Cubans 
also resented the hordes of American tourists that flew to Cuba to visit its casinos and brothels, 
which were owned by the Cuban mafia, the regime, or American companies. Therefore, despite a 
growth in Cuban economy was registered in the ‘50s, the lives of ordinary Cubans had not changed 
or had even worsened, in a country rich in natural resources, but seriously under-industrialized.  
Furthermore, in his speech Castro stressed the illegitimacy of Batista’s regime, since it came 
to power with a coup d’état and not through the planned democratic elections, which he would have 
lost. Additionally, the steep reduction in constitutional liberties was another of the main sources of 
Batista’s illegitimacy. With the reinstatement of a stricter crime of treason, Castro argued that even 
discussing politics could be punished. Moreover, the purposely vague phrasing of treason as an act 
‘military’ in nature meant that the police could be arbitrary in the administration of justice85. 
Finally, in the ‘treason’ area fell also strikes. This limitation of the right to strike for Castro was the 
culmination of Batista’s aggression against basic freedoms. Additionally, giving an interpretation of 
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recent history that blamed Batista for most of Cuba’s problems helped to unite different insurgent 
forces against a common enemy
86
. 
As Kice
87
 suggests, the ‘History will absolve me’ speech heavily relied on epideictic 
rhetoric, which is a form of rhetoric that centers around either praise or blame of a current 
situation
88
. Castro framed the present in binary terms through negation, constructing a clear distance 
between himself and Batista. What emerged from the speech was that Castro was not Batista, nor 
another corrupt Cuban politician, he was different, and wanted to bring freedom back to Cuba.  
Therefore, the central ideas that emerged from the ‘History will absolve me’ speech were 
twofold: Castro was not Batista, but was rather inspired by constitutional values and the heroes of 
Cuban independence; and the main objective of his group and the Revolution was to improve living 
conditions for ordinary Cubans, and they were willing to risk their lives to achieve it. The 
combination of these two infused a new legitimacy to Castro’s figure, who became a hero of the 
rebellion for the people. However, his rather radical ideas prevented him from gaining the support 
of mainstream political parties and other insurgent groups.  
Instead, Cubans took to the streets demanding Castro’s release, which happened a few 
months later. With the assault of the Moncada Barracks, Castro took upon himself the role of leader 
of what was beginning to be called the ‘Generation of the Centenary’, because of the 100th 
anniversary of Martí’s birth in 1853, providing them a direct link to the independence war and its 
legitimacy. For many, Castro and the M-26-7 were continuing Martí’s struggle for freedom89.    
What is extremely interesting about this speech is that it employs all three sources of 
legitimation that this thesis is taking into account: national-historic (in the link with the War of 
Independence), normative (in the illegitimacy of Batista’s rule), and by comparison. It may be for 
this intrinsic complexity that ‘History will absolve me’ turned into the main political framework for 
the Revolution.  
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b. The Manifesto of the Sierra Maestra (MSM)90 
 
In June 1957 five opposition leaders (Millo Ochoa and Carlos Márquez Sterling from the Ortodoxo 
Party, José Pardo Llada of the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, Porfiro Pendás of Defensa 
de la Constitución, and Amalio Fiallo of Movimiento de Liberación) published what was known as 
the ‘Manifesto of the Five’, a call for unity that advocated for a return to the 1940 Constitution, the 
end of violence, and free elections. The manifesto stated that peace was a responsibility of both the 
government and the citizens, and that a political solution was to be found, starting with Batista 
stepping down
91
.  
Castro responded to the ‘Manifesto of the Five’ with the ‘Manifesto of the Sierra Maestra’, 
on July 12, 1957. The manifesto was signed by Fidel, together with Raúl Chibás, an important 
leader of the Ortodoxo Party, and Felipe Pazos, economist and head of the National Bank of Cuba. 
Chibás and Pazos were well respected individuals, and, therefore, made the manifesto and Castro’s 
position more legitimate.  
The MSM urged all Cubans to support the revolutionary struggle against Batista, called for 
his immediate resignation, and for free elections. However, it was stated that the rebels would 
support elections only after the stepping down of Batista, because only in that case elections could 
really be free and fair. Moreover, the MSM clearly stated that the Revolution would continue until 
Batista or any other military junta would be in power and depriving Cubans form their 
constitutional rights. Therefore, the Manifesto of the Sierra Maestra promised a return to the 1940 
Constitution.  
 
Furthermore, the manifesto laid out proposed social reforms that would primarily benefit 
and protect the people living in rural areas, the first supporters of Castro’s M-26-7. These were less 
radical than those of the Moncada trial speech, and included agrarian reforms and a campaign 
against illiteracy
92
. 
 
In this case Castro used the authoritative legitimacy stemming from Chibás and Pazos to 
legitimize himself. Their reputation infused a whole new level of credibility to the manifesto’s 
provisions and gave it more political respectability. Moreover, the use of more moderate provisions 
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than those of the ‘History will absolve me’ pamphlet helped the new manifesto reach a broader 
public. 
 
12. Legitimation through the media 
 
a. Foreign interviews   
 
Following the disastrous Granma landing, Castro and the other survivors went into hiding in the 
mountains to regroup and rebuild their force. The lack of high-profile or visible actions by the 
group in the immediate aftermath spread the rumor of Castro’s death. When the rumor arrived to 
Castro himself, he understood that he had to come out of hiding and let everyone know that he was 
alive and fighting. However, the media and press in Cuba were under a total censorship regarding 
Castro and the Revolution and were only allowed to report news that came from the regime. For 
this reason, he decided to contact the foreign press. American press, in the specific, in a sort of re-
enactment of what José Martí did in 1895, during the War of Independence
93
.  
The first journalist to reach Castro in the Sierra Maestra was Herbert Matthews, a 
correspondent for The New York Times. Before leaving for Cuba, Matthews had described the 
Granma landing as “a recent invasion by terrorists”94. However, once he met Fidel and the other 
rebels, he was persuaded by their arguments and described Castro as a “flaming symbol of this 
opposition to the regime,” and being a man “of courage and of remarkable qualities of 
leadership”95. In his article, Matthews went beyond the interview and described the living 
conditions and the perils the guerrilla had to endure, turning them into idealized heroes fighting for 
freedom. “Before Matthews showed up, Castro was a man, a rebel, a hero. What Matthews did was 
invent Fidel as an idea, a conception that could remain elusive, always changing, unknowable, 
unfathomable, and therefore, in the end, undefeatable”96, he was a symbol of hope in a time of 
repression. 
b. Radio Rebelde  
 
The use of radio broadcast through Radio Rebelde proved to be a powerful means of propaganda. 
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The rebels would broadcast account of fights with the official army (frequently exaggerating their 
victories), speeches and thoughts of the leaders, commemorative speeches for fallen comrades, 
accounts of their work in favor of the local peasantry, like educational and health facilities, 
spreading the image of a powerful and yet humanitarian guerrilla campaign. 
During the 15
th
 anniversary of the institution of Radio Rebelde, Castro commented, “Radio 
Rebelde truly became our means of mass communication, to talk to the people, and it became a 
much listened to station. It was crucial for disseminating military information and played a key role 
throughout the war”97.  
The access to a radio broadcast highly increased Castro’s group’s visibility and the material 
that was broadcasted had a legitimating purpose. On the other hand, the urban fighters could not 
afford to be equivalently exposed, because of the fact that they had to hide from Batista’s police. 
This difference in visibility made the division between the two groups even more profound. While 
Castro could defend the actions of his men and highlight their victories, urban leaders did not have 
that option and this resulted in a degree of alienation from the people, who did not always 
understand the end behind some of their actions and were instead bombarded by Batista’s 
propaganda and accounts of his victories on the urban front.  
Radio Rebelde was intelligently used to reach wider constituencies and to promote M-26-7 
ideas and propaganda, to make the people relate to the struggle and make them feel part of it. 
Moreover, thanks to the monopoly of unofficial medias, Castro could present himself as the main 
revolutionary figure and the rural guerrilla as the strategy most likely to succeed
98
. Thanks to the 
accounts of battles on Radio Rebelde, it started to spread the idea that a rural guerrilla could 
actually defeat a conventional army, and more people joined the rebels in their efforts.  
The image created through Matthews’ and later Robert Taber’s accounts of the Sierra 
fighters spread not only in the United States, but also in Cuba
99
, supported by the reports from 
Radio Rebelde. Segments of Batista’s army began surrendering, fostering popular support for 
Castro, as the defections were interpreted as a synonym of the legitimacy of the M-26-7
100
. 
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13. Legitimation through official speeches 
 
A common strategy that Castro employed throughout all his most important speeches is the strategy 
of identification through division. He clearly separates ‘the Revolution’ from an enemy, which has 
changed through time, adapting to the new stages of the Revolution. The Revolution is, therefore, 
used to create a shared, new Cuban identity that encompasses everybody, including Castro himself. 
In this way, Castro creates a sense of collectiveness and closeness that makes it easier for people to 
sympathize with his fight and gives him legitimacy through contrast with the illegitimacy of the 
enemy
101
.  
In a speech titled “What is a Real Democracy”, delivered on the 26th of July 1959, Castro 
presents his idea of democracy and, quoting Lincoln, states that democracy is the “government of 
the people, by the people, for the people”102. To answer those who criticized Cuba for a lack of 
democracy, Castro states that “democracy is the fulfillment of the will of the people”103, and since it 
was the people who demanded him to take the power, Cuba was a democracy. Moreover, he 
claimed that the millions of people that regularly participated in his rallies were a form of direct 
democracy
104
. 
 
14.  Change in discourse over time 
 
The Moncada trial defense was printed and became the political manifesto of the M-26-7. However, 
its content was deemed too extreme by some other revolutionary groups and the Moncada attackers 
were branded as terrorists and extremists. To gain a larger following and to be able to impose 
himself as the sole leader of the revolutionary forces, in 1957 Castro wrote the Manifesto of the 
Sierra Maestra, a less radical pamphlet that had the desired effect of rallying more support both 
from the population and other groups. With the Caracas Pact (20 July 1958), Castro imposed 
himself as the de facto leader of the Revolution, managing to impose his candidate (Manuel 
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Urrutia) as the official candidate for the provisional presidency after the ousting of Batista.  
Despite the rather radical provisions of ‘History will absolve me’, the image of the guerrillas 
was one of fighters driven by egalitarian and democratic ideologies, social justice, and the tangible 
political goal to overthrow Batista and establish fairer conditions for all Cubans
105
. The ousting of 
Batista was presented as the solution to all of Cuba’s problems. However, as previously mentioned, 
Castro rarely stated specific goals for after Batista’s ousting, choosing to concentrate on common 
ideas and goals that encompassed different political agendas.  
Aside from the ‘History will absolve me’ speech, which was mainly an indictment of the 
past, Castro was purposely vague in his speeches and manifestos, trying to mobilize as broad a 
following as possible by citing mainly widely supported themes, such as the restoration of 
democracy and freedoms, and social justice. The fact that ‘History will absolve me’ endured as the 
central programmatic paper during the whole Revolution means that legitimacy was achieved 
through the exploitation and manipulation of history, rather than ideology
106
. Moreover, being Cuba 
a predominantly agricultural nation, Castro’s attack to the exploitation of peasants by big 
landowners was not seen only as a socialist theme, but also as a nationalist issue. In fact, high 
percentages of fertile Cuban lands were owned by foreigners
107
, preventing industrial 
diversification and the strengthening of Cuban economy.  
 
Once Castro came to power his speeches continued highlighting the crucial importance of 
popular support, and turned it into a sort of Greek direct democracy. Moreover, with his speeches 
Castro created a narrative of common struggle against the shared enemy that was Batista, and later 
the United States, therefore neglecting internal rivalries and disunity, promoting a new 
interpretation of the Revolution that stressed the morality and necessity of the struggle for national 
sovereignty and against corruption and abuse
108
.  
The first measures to be implemented had a high symbolic meaning and were mainly 
nationalist and populist in nature: to distance the new government from the recent past, Castro 
nationalized many US-owned industries, the casinos and brothels were closed, and military barracks 
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converted into schools. These measures were highly political and were devised to reclaim national 
sovereignty and to clear Cuba from US influence.  
The revolutionary trials against segments of the army played a public role too. While these 
were heavily criticized by the USA, they met with the (apparent) widespread support of the Cuban 
population. In fact, Castro repeatedly asked the public if they supported the trials and was met with 
an overwhelming positive response
109
. The trials were mainly summary and consisted of the 
testimony of the tortures suffered by common people. Most of the accused were found guilty and 
sentenced to execution.  
 
Furthermore, the role of history as a driving force of the Revolution was reaffirmed through 
policies of retribution and restoration. The government carried out policies of confiscation of goods 
belonging to the accused or that were misappropriated during the previous dictatorship. The army 
and the political parties that supported Batista’s rule were dissolved, and Batista’s loyalists were 
purged from the public administration, with many leaving the country, alongside many 
industrialists, preoccupied with the redistribution and nationalization policies the government had 
started implementing. All of these actions were took in the name of the people against any 
remaining manifestation of Batista’s rule.  History was assigned a double role: all of Cuba’s 
problems, such as poor living conditions and illiteracy, were presented as a result of imperialist 
exploitation and the illegitimate rule of Batista. On the other hand, history was a crucial element for 
the legitimation of the Revolution: it provided evidence of the long-standing tradition of resistance 
to exploitation and tyranny from the Cuban population
110
, justifying the use of force in its illustrious 
precedents. Therefore, the actions of the Cuban government in its early days were “anti-capitalist in 
orientation and rhetoric but not Marxist in methodology. Its determinism [was] moral rather than 
economic; its emphasis on action rather than theory.”111 
 
Aside from small changes in terminology and media aimed at captivating different audiences, 
the core of the legitimation strategy did not undergo any substantial variation in the different stages 
of the Revolution and the early government. Central to it were national-historical and populist 
issues, together with anti-imperialistic sentiments that stemmed directly from them. Even if it is true 
that there were socialist and communist drives to the Revolution, the exceptional political and 
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historical reality of the 1950s Cuba made it possible for them to be read as national-populistic by 
big portions of the population. In fact, the narrative of national liberation from foreign oppression 
was at the same time synonym of an anti-imperialist sentiment, and of the continuation of the War 
of Independence and its search for national sovereignty. In the same way, the agrarian reform and 
policy of redistribution were both part of a socialist agenda, and the result of reclaiming what was 
misappropriated by the Batista’s dictatorship. The same double explication could be applied to the 
policies of nationalization and literacy, among others.  
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15.  Conclusion 
 
This thesis was concerned with the legitimation strategies of non-state actors and analysed the 
Cuban Revolution as a case study. The work was divided into paragraph, each analyzing a different 
source of legitimation strategy, or a different means of communication that was used to reach the 
target audience.  
Referring back to the literature, Schlichte and Schneckener put forward three separate 
legitimation processes that violent non-state actors need to implement: first, they need to present 
their violent means as legitimate; furthermore, they need legitimation to gain a following and moral 
and material support; finally, they need to address their claims simultaneously to different 
audiences, both nationally and internationally.  
Regarding the legitimation of violence, the most common claims concern its defensive use; 
the protection of oppressed communities; a reaction to injustice; self-determination. In the case of 
the Cuban Revolution, these claims were often combined, resulting in a complex and profound 
legitimation strategy. The insurgents claimed to be fighting in favour of the oppressed Cuban 
population, which was subject to random violence by the police and army, misappropriations, 
mistrials, limitation of liberties, and other forms of injustice. Additionally, being the Batista 
government heavily sponsored by the United States, the rebels could claim to act in the name of 
self-determination and freedom.   
Moreover, a further source of legitimation is Weber’s ‘charismatic leadership’, that entails 
the mystification or martyrdom of the most prominent figures of the struggle. The creation of 
heroes ready to sacrifice themselves for the sake of the greater good helps depict an idealized, 
invincible epic struggle. Since the Moncada trial, Fidel Castro emerged as a young and charismatic 
idealist, image that was confirmed by the interviews with foreign journalists, first of all the one by 
Matthews, in which the guerrillas were depicted as idealized and selfless fighters for freedom 
against a repressive regime. As DePalma
112
 points out, Matthews transformed Fidel into an 
invincible idea, changing his perception both in Cuba and abroad.   
Furthermore, legitimation processes are directed both outwards and inwards, and multiple 
legitimation strategies might be implemented at once. Two broad categories of sources of 
legitimation can be distinguished: symbolic and performance-centered. Symbolic sources are those 
stemming from the narrative put forward by the group, while performance-centered legitimating 
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strategies are linked to its behavior and performance, both in relation with the adversary army and, 
perhaps most importantly, with the local population.  
Traditional belief provides a crucial source of legitimacy in a number of armed groups. 
Through the link to heroic figures of the past, armed leaders possess intrinsic legitimacy as their 
heirs. On the same note, professional or military status grants a similar legitimacy. Fidel Castro 
repeatedly linked himself and his movement to the figure of José Martí and other heroes of the War 
of Indepenence against Spain. Claiming a parallel between these two causes, Castro granted himself 
the residual legitimacy of that struggle, while also adding nationalist and anti-imperialist themes to 
the legitimation strategy.  
Moreover, a common symbolic strategy is to claim to represent the local population, taking 
on their grievances, and make them relevant. In this way, armed groups claim to act on the behalf of 
the population and in their interest. Finally, the threat of an enemy is a powerful source of 
legitimation. In this context, violence is legitimated as a means to defend the local population. The 
more corrupt and brutal the enemy, the more solidarity and acceptance the group will receive. In 
Cuba, the revolutionaries did claim to fight for the whole Cuban population, against the corrupted 
and repressive regime of Batista. Their goal was to gain better living conditions and to bring back 
freedom to a country with a troubled recent history.  
Finally, performance-centered sources of legitimation include ‘charismatic leadership’, 
patrimonial and personal loyalties, and ‘delivery-based legitimization’, which entails a legitimation 
strategy based on the delivery of services to the fighters and local population. Throughout the 
Revolution, the M-26-7 strove to maintain a ‘humanitarian’ image, in comparison with the brutality 
of Batista’s army. This helped foster popular support in favour of the revolutionaries. The 26th of 
July Movement was able to establish a revolutionary government in the Sierra Maestra, providing a 
code of law, basic medic services and schools to the local population. Through their fair treatment 
of peasants, the insurgents gained legitimacy, particularly in comparison to the cruelty employed by 
the regular army.  
The analysis of the first political manifesto of the Revolution, the ‘History will absolve me’, 
is central to the analysis, because of its iconic nature and complex use of legitimating sources. 
Conventionally, the Cuban Revolution is agreed to have started on July 26, 1953, day in which a 
small number of armed students carried out an attack to the Moncada military Barrack, led by Fidel 
Castro. Aside from the practical objective of seizing weapons to arm the insurgency, the attack 
carried a profound symbolic meaning, and the attackers began to be known as the ‘Generation of 
the Centenary’, being 1953 the 100th anniversary of José Martí’s birth. ‘History will absolve me’ 
was mainly a denounce of the injustices perpetrated by the illegitimate and repressive regime of 
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Batista, and a declaration of principles of the insurgency. Castro advocated for the overthrown of 
the current government, and the implement of social reforms. During this speech, Castro combines 
all three of the sources of legitimation strategy analyzed in this thesis. He uses comparison to 
achieve legitimacy through a dissociation from Batista and other dictators. Moreover, the continue 
reference to the writings of Martí, Chibás, and the Constitution, are examples of national-historical 
sources of legitimation. Normative sources were implemented when Castro stressed the illegitimate 
way Batista came to power, and his intentional progressive limitation of constitutional liberties in 
the island.    
Therefore, during the Cuban Revolution and in its immediate aftermath, the 26
th
 of July 
Movement and its leader Fidel Castro implemented a complex and multi-faceted legitimation 
strategy. The main elements of this strategy can be divided into national-historic, authoritative-
normative sources, and through comparison. Different strategies were implemented to reach 
different audiences, oftentimes combining sources of legitimation to reach the broader constituency 
possible. Through a smart use of the media and the technology that was available, the guerrillas 
were able to spread their vision and legitimating narrative, providing some counterweight to the 
reports that were printed in the newspapers, galvanizing ample sectors of the population and 
demoralizing the official army, which soon started to defect. However, what all those three 
legitimation strategies had in common was the notion that the Revolution was for the people’s sake, 
to free them from an oppressive government, and to increase their standard of living. It was the 
popular aspect of the Revolution that made the separate strategies cohesive and successful.  
 
a. Did the presence of charismatic and visible leaders aid the legitimating process?   
During the Moncada trial, Fidel Castro proved to be well versed in rhetoric, and proposed himself 
as a new, charismatic leader of the Revolution. The text of his defense plea was printed as a 
pamphlet and spread among the population, which rallied to ask his release, a testimony of his 
power of persuasion.  
Moreover, a deciding factor in the success of the Revolution and the triumph of the M-26-7 
in particular was the high visibility that Castro enjoyed from 1957 onwards. Thanks to the relative 
safety from Batista’s army provided by the Sierra Maestra, Castro had the opportunity to expose 
himself to the media more than other rebel leaders. His charisma helped him turn Matthews into a 
supporter of the guerrillas, even if he was a proclaimed skeptic before adventuring in the Sierra 
Maestra. In the same way, through the Radio Rebelde broadcasts, Castro and other prominent 
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members of the M-26-7 spread their ideas and values, making people feel closer to their struggle 
and helping to cement the image of guerrillas as mystical, selfless fighters.  
 
b. Did the narrative of a common enemy increase the cohesion of the revolutionary 
groups and help foster internal legitimation?  
From an early stage, through the strategy of legitimation by comparison, Castro dissociated himself 
and his fighters from Batista and his army. This distance was repeatedly reaffirmed both through 
speeches and actions. One of the main themes that emerged from the ‘History will absolve me’ 
speech was that Castro was not Batista or any other dictator. Moreover, all of the problems and 
under-development of Cuba were blamed on Batista’s rule. Through the years, Batista and his 
overthrown served the role of unifier of the separate armed groups and created cohesion of intention 
among insurgents, mainstream political parties, and large segments of the population. The depiction 
of Batista as the common enemy was successful also thanks to a steep fall of his perceived 
legitimacy. His purges of political opposition costed him political support, while the brutality with 
which his army handled the repression of insurgents and intellectuals through means of 
indiscriminate violence, widely employing torture, imprisonment, and forced relocation, alienated 
ample sectors of the population. At the same time, the Sierra fighters were broadcasting reports of 
the services they provided to the rural population, such as schools, medical care and a judicial 
system, and strove to spread a ‘humanitarian’ image of their treatment of prisoners. This 
comparison between brutality and mercy helped foster the idea of Batista as illegitimate in the eyes 
of the population.  
 Furthermore, in the figure of Batista was also condensed the anti-imperialist feeling that was 
still present among Cubans. This was possible because of different reasons: first of all, Batista had 
the open support of the American government which, during the first stages of the Revolution, 
provided him with arms and intelligence support; moreover, he encouraged foreign investment and 
tourism, which diverted funds from the majority of the population to the regime and the Cuban 
mafia; finally, with the limitation of constitutional liberties that followed Batista’s coup d'état, he 
was accused of undermining the successes of the War of Independence, reviving the anti-imperialist 
and nationalist feelings that drove that struggle.  
 Therefore, the overthrown of Batista was the fulcrum of any programmatic document. In this 
context, the insurgents positioned themselves as the guardians of Cuban values, history, and people. 
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c. By analysing the ethno-religious background of the Sierra Maestra fighters, Farber 
suggests that they were bound to be more attracted to national-populist discourse, 
rather than communist ideology.  
While I did not study the ethno-religious background of the fighters and supporters of the 
Revolution, the results of the analysis pointed out that one of the main sources of legitimation was 
national-historical and that it had populist connotations. From the sources and discourses I 
analyzed, communist ideology did not appear to be the main source of legitimation, but it was 
rather a combination of national-historical and normative claims. To determine if this was a 
conscious choice to present the Revolution as more moderate, or if national concerns were the real 
driving forces of the Revolution, and the choice of building a communist state was made in a later 
stage, was not an aim of the thesis, and has, therefore, not been analyzed. However, this might be 
the starting point for further research.  
 
Limitations of the work and challenges for future research: 
A challenge that one encounters when researching an authoritarian regime is that the information 
available may be corrupted or partial. In the case of Cuba, the Batista dictatorship was closely 
followed by another authoritarian government that still persists, perpetuating the difficulty of 
finding complete and reliable information. The analysis of legitimacy further complicates the 
challenge, since in authoritarian regimes preference falsification is a common practice. However, 
being legitimation strategies, rather than legitimacy, the focus of the analysis, reduces the problem 
of preference falsification. Therefore, this thesis tried to combine various explanations based on 
different legitimation theories to get a picture as complete and inclusive as possible. This approach 
could be the basis for further research.   
The aim of this thesis was to be descriptive and to depict the legitimation strategies in the 
most objective way possible. However, for reasons of time and space constraint, the analysis 
focuses only on legitimation strategies implemented by the 26
th
 of July Movement and Fidel Castro 
and what was deemed relevant to the three sources of legitimation I laid out. Therefore, there has 
been a skimming of the available documents and discourses produced during the Cuban Revolution, 
to serve the scope of the thesis. This means that the findings of the thesis are relevant only to the 
explanation of the (self-)legitimation strategies implemented by the M-26-7, which are not 
necessarily coincident with the strategies of the Cuban Revolution as a whole, or of other insurgent 
groups. However, this choice was made taking into account the central role played by Fidel Castro 
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as Prime Minister, and in light of the endurance of the regime, whose official narrative depicts the 
M-26-7 as the main responsible for the overthrown of Batista and the triumph of the Revolution.   
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